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INTRODUCTION 
This Comment seeks to address the potential means of recourse available to 
residents of Flint, Michigan in response to the municipality’s recent water crisis.  
This Comment explores the legal tools available to Flint residents to obtain 
restitution and direct compensation, and concludes that a dual public-private 
compensation scheme modeled after the New Jersey Spill Fund and One Fund 
Boston, respectively, is more likely to provide Flint residents with direct 
compensation in a timely manner.  Though a federal victims’ compensation 
fund—modeled after the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund—would be the ideal 
legal tool to compensate victims of the Flint water crisis, this Comment 
recognizes the barriers to enacting federal legislation to provide direct 
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compensation without sufficient financial incentive.  The fact that Flint residents 
have been living with lead-tainted water for three years without Congress 
enacting such legislation suggest that such federal legislation is unlikely to come 
to fruition.  Accordingly, a hybrid state-private compensation scheme 
encompassing elements of the 9/11 Fund, such as the requirement that recipients 
waive their right to pursue tort litigation, is a viable alternative to compensate 
victims of the Flint water crisis as soon as possible. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: THE WATER CRISIS IN FLINT, 
MICHIGAN 
A. Flint’s former glory as the “Vehicle City” 
In 1903, Will Durant of the Buick Motor Company convinced Buick’s 
suppliers, such as Champion Spark Plug Company, Weston-Mott (Axle) 
Company, and Fisher Body Company, to relocate to Flint, Michigan.
1
  Shortly 
thereafter in September 1908, Durant founded General Motors (“GM”), the sole 
objective of which was to consolidate Buick Motor Company and its affiliates in 
Flint.
2
  Not only was GM founded in Flint, but the city was also the birthplace of 
the United Auto Workers union.
3
  Accordingly, Flint flourished as an industrial 
hub, where generations of workers and their families benefited from the 
automobile industry boom that occurred after both World Wars.
4
  Communities 
surrounding Flint similarly benefited from GM’s development, particularly after 
World War II, as advancements in the gasoline engine led to increased agriculture 
and farming, which overtook land use in the Flint River watershed.
5
 
With Flint’s economy tied to GM’s prosperity, the housing market in Flint 
could not keep up with the influx of new residents seeking employment in the 
early twentieth century.
6
  By 1920, Flint’s population of 91,600 was nearly seven 
 
 1. Joseph M. Leonardi & William J. Gruhn, FLINT RIVER ASSESSMENT, MICH. DEP’T OF NAT. 
RESO. 23 (July 2001), 
http://www.michigandnr.com/PUBLICATIONS/PDFS/ifr/ifrlibra/Special/Reports/sr27.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HLR3-QLCY]; see also Wes Janz, This is Flint, Michigan, in All Its Pain and All 
Its Glory, GRIST (Feb. 17, 2011), http://grist.org/urbanism/2011-02-15-this-is-flint-michigan/  
[https://perma.cc/EW2P-QVBG] (describing the growth of Flint, Michigan as a company town 
during the twentieth century, earning itself the nickname “Vehicle City”).   
 2. Leonardi & Gruhn, supra note 1. 
 3. Leonardi & Gruhn, supra note 1.  
 4. Janz, supra note 1 (noting that in the mid-twentieth century, 80,000 of the 190,000 Flint 
residents were employed by General Motors). 
 5. Leonardi & Gruhn, supra note 1, at 24. 
 6. Kayla Ruble, The Unraveling of Flint: How “Vehicle City” Stalled Long Before the Water 
Crisis, VICE NEWS (Jan. 26, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/the-unraveling-of-flint-
how-vehicle-city-stalled-long-before-the-water-crisis [https://perma.cc/TU37-9WJG].  
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times its population in 1900 of 13,103.
7
  As a result, the State sought to add new 
subdivisions to the city on Flint’s undeveloped land.
8
  The city continued to 
experience overwhelming growth during the twentieth century; in 1968, the year 
of peak employment by GM, Flint had one of the country’s highest per capita 
income levels for a city of its size.
9
 
B. Forces driving Flint’s fiscal demise: the creation of an isolated 
urban center 
Because Flint’s finances were dependent on GM, the 1973 oil embargo, 
after which more than 20,000 GM workers were laid off, inaugurated Flint’s 
decline.
10
  Shortly thereafter, the recession of the 1980s, coupled with high gas 
prices, ushered in the end of economic prosperity in Flint.
11
  By 1988, GM’s 
employment began to steadily decline, driving former GM employees out of Flint 
in search of work elsewhere.
12
  The closure of the Flint GM plant not only had an 
economic impact on the city itself, but it forced its suppliers in Flint and the 
surrounding cities to close their doors as well.  For example, the AC Spark Plug 
plant in Flint ceased production, as did the iron foundry plants in Saginaw, which 
is connected to the Flint River through a web of lakes and streams.
13
 
As a result, abandoned properties and demolished factories were left in 
place of the once booming city.  One resident pointed specifically to a vacancy 
near “Buick City,” an area in Flint’s north side, where a 235-acre Buick plant 
formerly resided until it was demolished in 2002.
14
  Emblematic of the current 
state of Flint’s economy, the area—one of the country’s largest brownfields—
now features a chain link fence with barbed wire surrounding an empty plot of 
overgrown land.
15
  With the exodus of major employers, Flint lost a large portion 
of its wealthy residents during the 1990s.
16
  Following a population decline of 
17.4% in the 1970s, Flint’s population dwindled by 18% in the first decade of the 
 
 7. GARY FLINN, REMEMBERING FLINT, MICHIGAN: STORIES FROM THE VEHICLE CITY 49 
(2010).  
 8. Id. 
 9. GORDON YOUNG, TEARDOWN: MEMOIR OF A VANISHING CITY 2 (2013). 
 10. Brent D. Ryan, Shrinking-City Urban Form as a Determinant of Urban Policy: The Case 
of Flint, Michigan, USA, URB. FORM & URB. POL’Y: 48TH ISOCARP CONGRESS 3-4 (2012), 
http://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/2253.pdf [https://perma.cc/255V-2DS6] (internal citation 
omitted). 
 11. Ruble, supra note 6. 
 12. Id. 
 13. David Rosner, Editorial, Flint, Michigan: A Century of Environmental Injustice, 106 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 200, 200 (2016).  
 14. Ruble, supra note 6. 
 15. Janz, supra note 1; Ruble, supra note 6. 
 16. Ruble, supra note 6. 
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  By 2014, half of the Flint population of its golden age had 
fled to the suburbs.
18
 
In contrast to the early mid-twentieth century, when Flint’s population 
exceeded its available housing, the rate of housing abandonment in the twenty-
first century created long-term budgetary issues for the city.
19
  According to U.S. 
Census data, housing vacancy in Flint increased from 8.2% in 1990 to 21.1% in 
2010, diminishing revenue and property values and limiting the municipality’s 
budget to provide police, fire protection, and other services to protect public 
health and safety.
20
  Since 2000, Flint has been on an arduous downward slide, 
losing 25% of its revenue from property taxes and income, 32% of the revenue 
sharing provided by the State, and 21% of its population in response to, and 
causing, declines in commercial activity.
21
  During this same period, the assessed 
value of all property in Flint has declined by 43% and its tax base is just slightly 
more than $6,000 per resident at present.
22
  In light of the loss of population and 
attendant revenue, Flint no longer has the resources or the manpower necessary 
to deliver services.  Underscoring the dire state of Flint’s resources, the city was 
recently identified as both the most dangerous city in the United States and the 
murder capital of the country.
23
 
Not only did the shrinking population of Flint lead the city to economic 
decline, but it also perpetuated the water crisis that came to fruition in 2014.  Of 
the more than 550 miles of water mains beneath the city, the majority are cast-
iron pipes that were built more than seventy-five years ago.  With the city’s 
population measurably shrinking—from 141,553 to fewer than 100,000 by 
2013—pools of water gathered in lead-service lines for extended periods time.
24
  
This wading water did not produce adverse health effects when Flint purchased 
treated Lake Huron water from Detroit; rather, those effects began with the 
 
 17. Eric Scorsone & Nicolette Bateson, Long-Term Crisis and Systematic Failure: Taking the 
Fiscal Stress of America’s Older Cities Seriously, MICH. ST. UNIV. EXTENSION 1, 2 (2011), 
https://www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/Reports/MSUE_FlintStudy2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2C7V-TUR2]. 
 18. Ruble, supra note 6. 
 19. Scorsone & Bateson, supra note 17, at 4. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
 21. Stephen Henderson, Flint’s Long Misery, at the Hands of Urban Policy, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Jan. 30, 2016, 11:18 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/stephen-
henderson/2016/01/30/flints-long-misery-hands-urban-policy/79531718/ [https://perma.cc/5EXQ-
BXMB]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. David Harris, CQ Press Ranks Flint as Most Dangerous City, MLIVE (Dec. 15, 2011 2:34 
PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2011/12/cq_press_ranks_flint_as_most_d.html 
[https://perma.cc/8UNZ-8JZD]. 
 24. Matt Pearce, A “Man-Made Disaster” Unfolded in Flint Within Plain Sight of Water 
Regulators, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016, 6:51 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-flint-water-
20160122-story.html [https://perma.cc/R6AS-C22A]. 
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decision to source water from the Flint River.
25
  Because the water from the Flint 
River is typically a higher temperature and contains more organic material than 
the water from Lake Huron, the idle pools of water fostered the growth of 
bacteria, such as Legionella.
26
  Indeed, the post-industrial state of Flint after 
wealthier populations took flight from the city set the stage for Flint’s impending 
financial – and consequently, public health – crisis. 
C. Structural impediments: hyper-local governance and budgetary 
constraints 
The recent water crisis in Flint is the culmination of the systemic 
disinvestment in the city’s infrastructure.  With recurring deficits in governmental 
funds, Flint sought temporary relief by appointing an Emergency Financial 
Manager (“EFM”) for the first time in 2002.
27
  From May 2002 to January 2006, 
a governor-appointed EFM allowed Flint to move from a General Fund deficit of 
$26.6 million to a $6.1 million surplus.
28
  However, this economic improvement 
quickly reversed, as labor union settlements, litigation, and declining 
municipality revenues forced Flint to enter a deficit once again.
29
  By 2008, Flint 
had returned to a deficit of $6.8 million.
30
 
Subsequently, the State sought to end the cycle of returning to a deficit in 
Flint by replacing the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1990 with 
the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011.
31
  
The adopted statute incentivizes local governments to address budgetary 
constraints before the Governor assigns an EFM.
32
  As the revised statute failed 
to provide Flint with necessary economic resuscitation, the State declared a 
financial state of emergency in Flint on November 8, 2011 and seized control of 
 
 25. Mitch Smith, A Water Dilemma in Michigan: Cloudy or Costly?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/us/a-water-dilemma-in-michigan-cheaper-or-
clearer.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/Z3JZ-SFZA].  
 26. Elisha Anderson, Legionnaires’ – Associated Deaths Grow to 12 in Flint Area, DET. FREE 
PRESS (Apr. 11, 2016, 6:59 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/04/11/legionnaires-deaths-flint-water/82897722/ [https://perma.cc/GWH4-5DCC] 
(noting that 12 deaths due to Legionnaires’ disease have been confirmed, allegedly from 
consumption of contaminated water).  For further discussion of the decision to switch Flint’s water 
source from Lake Huron to the Flint River, see infra Part C. 
 27. Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1990, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 141.1101-18 (West 1990), repealed by Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 141.1541 (West 2013) (noting prior to repeal that an emergency financial manager 
would be allowed to exercise the authority and responsibilities provided in the act to the extent 
authorized). 
 28. Scorsone & Bateson, supra note 17, at 9. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.1501-31 (West 2012). 
 32. Scorsone & Bateson, supra note 17, at 9. 
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all budgetary decisions for the second time in a decade.
33
  Rather than curb the 
use of an EFM, the revised statute perpetuated a forty-one months long state of 
emergency, spanning four EFMs and another change in Michigan’s emergency 
manager statute.
34
  For example, Governor Snyder appointed Michael K. Brown, 
a former mayor of Flint, as the EFM twice over the span of four years, allegedly 
to “cut the budget, at any cost.”
35
  In April 2014, EFM Darnell Earley apparently 
embodied that same mentality, as he chose to temporarily switch Flint’s water 
supply from Lake Huron to the Flint River to construct a regional pipeline—a 




Michigan’s approach to municipal finance, which is hyper-focused on 
specific cities, rather than systemic inequities, broad tax structure, and 
overarching infrastructure shortfalls, has led to the creation of poor, isolated 
urban islands.
37
  Whereas Flint’s population and tax base has steadily declined 
since Michigan first authorized the appointment of an EFM in 2002, surrounding 
suburban communities, which lack any economic connection to the city, have 
grown stronger.  For example, Grand Blanc, fewer than nine miles from Flint, 
has experienced a 6% growth in its assessed property valuation in the past decade.  
Currently, Grand Blanc is valued at $132,000 per capita—a valuation more than 
six times that of Flint.
38
  Flushing is yet another example of a wealthy suburb that 
has experienced stable growth in population, an increase in its tax base, and a 
steady increase in median household income, while Flint, a city just a stone’s 
throw away, entered into receivership.
39
  As the stark dichotomy between Flint 
and its surrounding suburbs demonstrates, the municipal government responded 
to Flint’s receivership by viewing its finances in a vacuum, rather than by 
focusing on holistic measures to mitigate the systemic effects of de-
industrialization and suburban sprawl. 
 
 
 33. Sara Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water Became Toxic in Michigan, CNN (Jan. 13, 2016, 
10:53 AM), http:// www. cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-tap-water-flint-michigan/  [https://perma
.cc/5HBW-EJPY].  
 34. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1541 (West 2013); A Look Back at Flint’s Long Financial 
Emergency, MLIVE (Apr. 2015), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/04/follow_flints_
long_road_back_f.html#0 [https://perma.cc/U3WK-SPZ8]. 
 35. Ganim & Tran, supra note 33 (emphasis added). 
 36. Smith, supra note 25; A Look Back at Flint’s Long Financial Emergency, supra note 34. 
 37. See CLEMMENS ZIMMERMAN, INDUSTRIAL CITIES: HISTORY AND FUTURE 149 (2013) 
(describing Flint as epitomizing urban shrinkage, a condition common to the “Rust Belt,” where 
officials engage in “smart growth” to minimize the effect of population decreases due to economic 
decline); see also Henderson, supra note 21 (identifying Flint’s cycle of financial crisis as 
symptomatic of Michigan’s political shortsightedness with regards to innovative urban policy). 
 38. Henderson, supra note 21. 
 39. Id. 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE CITY OF FLINT’S CONTAMINATED AND 
COSTLY WATER SUPPLY 
A. The toxicity of Flint’s water supply 
Flint resident Melissa Mays recounted that “[d]epending on the day . . .  the 
water flowing out of her home’s faucets might have a blue tint.  Or it might smell 
like mothballs.  Or it might fill her home with the scent of an overchlorinated [sic] 
swimming pool.”
40
  Ms. Mays remembers that “she started having rashes, and 
clumps of her hair fell out.”
41
  As a result, similarly situated Flint residents have 
gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid even showering in Flint water; such efforts 




Two years ago, at an April 25, 2014 ceremony in a Flint water control 
facility, Mayor Dyane Walling lifted a glass of clear water to celebrate the 
decision to stop piping water from Detroit.
43
  As onlookers counted down, 
Walling pressed a button switching the water supply, resulting in cheers of “Hear, 
hear!” as Flint officials drank some of the last clean water available to the city.
44
  
On that now infamous day, the city began treating Flint River water at the Flint 
Water Treatment Plant and distributing that water to the community in place of 
the more expensive Lake Huron water piped from Detroit.
45
  Although Detroit 
treated its water supply with orthophosphate to coat leaded pipes and the Flint 
River is nineteen times more corrosive than Lake Huron,
46
 the Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) failed to order that an anti-
corrosive agent be added to the water to ensure its conformity with the 
requirements set forth in the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule (“LCR”).
47
  Rather, 
 
 40. Smith, supra note 25. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Abby Goodnough, In Flint, Fears of Showering Bring Desperate Measures, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/us/in-flint-rashes-stirfears-of-showering-as-
scientists-hunt-forculprit.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/K9ST-4K9U].  
 43. Pearce, supra note 24. 
 44. Id. 
 45. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 16 (Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805
_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2TJ-L4CM].  
 46. Rob Jordan, Q&A: Stanford Water Expert on Lessons of Flint, Michigan, Crisis, 
STANFORD REPORT (Mar. 11, 2016), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2016/march/flint-water-luthy-
031116.html [https://perma.cc/9NMX-WQLP]; see also Chad Livengood, Flint Mayor: Water Fix 
Could Cost as Much as $1.5B, DET. NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/07/flint-water/78404218/ 
[https://perma.cc/N59Q-F7RD] (reporting that fixing up to 500 miles of pipes in Flint could cost 
upwards of $1.5 billion).  
 47. Control of Lead and Copper Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 141.81 (1991) (requiring systems serving 
more than 50,000 persons to optimize corrosion control through specific steps, including monitoring, 
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the MDEQ directed the city to complete two six-month monitoring periods, after 
which the MDEQ would determine whether corrosion control was needed.
48
 
Almost immediately after Flint began sourcing its water from the Flint 
River, residents complained of the water’s off-putting color, taste, and smell.  
These complaints fell on deaf ears, as state officials disregarded residents’ 
concerns about the water’s safety.
49
  Indeed, as Flint was under the control of an 
EFM, the city’s elected mayor was not authorized to modify the city’s budgetary 
plan even if officials recognized the veracity of residents’ complaints.
50
 
Shortly thereafter, however, abnormally high levels of E.coli, 
trihalomethanes, lead, and copper were identified in the city’s water supply.
51
  
The identification of fecal coliform bacteria in the city’s first monitoring period, 
for example, led the city to issue warnings requiring citizens to boil water.
52
  
Corroborating residents’ concerns about the water quality, GM announced in 
October 2014 that it would cease to use Flint’s water for its Flint Engine 
Operations facility, as the levels of chloride in the water correlated to the 
corrosion of metal parts.
53
  Notwithstanding GM’s announcement, Flint officials 
remained steadfast in their assertion that the water was safe, highlighting that GM 
officials continued to drink Flint water.
54
  Rather than return to the Detroit water 
supply, the city responded by adding additional chlorine to the water supply.
55
 
Two months later, however, the MDEQ notified Flint officials that it had 
violated the Safe Drinking Water Act,
56
 as the city’s increased chlorine treatment 
resulted in further increases in trihalomethanes.
57
  Although the MDEQ provided 
a sample notice letter to officials to send to residents, which warned that “[p]eople 
who drink water containing trihalomethanes in excess of the [Maximum 
 
corrosion controlling studies, installation of treatment, and follow-up sampling). 
 48. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 16. 
 49. Jacob Lederman, Flint’s Water Crisis is No Accident, IN THESE TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), 
http://inthesetimes.com/article/18794/flint-water-crisis-neoliberalism-free-market-reforms-rick-
snyder [https://perma.cc/ZX6R-4K7V].  
 50. Id. 
 51. Alana Semuels, Aging Pipes Are Poisoning America’s Tap Water, THE ATLANTIC (July 29, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/dont-drink-the-water/399803/ [https:// 
perma.cc/ZCR8-ZLAL] (citing 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL 
ENG’RS (2013)). 
 52. Lederman, supra note 49. 
 53. Pearce, supra note 24. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Lederman, supra note 49. 
 56. MICH. SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT, Pub. Act 399 (1976). 
 57. Testimony of Susan Hedman, EPA Region 5 Administrator Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. (2013) (referencing the Notice of Violation for Total 
Trihalomethane exceedances issued by the MDEQ in December 2014); FLINT WATER ADVISORY 
TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 18 (noting that based on 100 samples, which were not necessarily 
drawn from the highest risk homes as intended by the LCR, the MDEQ recognized that the 90th 
percentile lead result was 6ppb, with 2 sample levels above 15ppb, the “action level” for lead). 
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Contaminant Level] over many years may experience problems with their liver, 
kidneys, or central nervous system, and may have increased risk of getting 
cancer,” the notice also expressly declined to accept that the city’s violation of 
drinking water standards was an emergency.
58
  Further, even though the high lead 
content found after the first six-month round of LCR monitoring ended on 
December 31, 2014 would require that the Flint Water Treatment Plant 
implement corrosion control treatment under the LCR, the MDEQ failed to 
properly advise administrators of this regulation.
59
 
Notwithstanding the MDEQ’s admission that Flint’s water had reached an 
unsafe level of contamination, residents’ safety concerns were not fully 
substantiated until an outsider, Virginia Tech Professor Marc Edwards, turned his 
attention to the alleged contamination of the Flint water supply in 2015.  Under 
Professor Edwards’s direction, Virginia Tech conducted a field study of 252 Flint 
homes to determine the corrosiveness of the Flint River and, in turn, the toxicity 
of the water supply.
60
  Virginia Tech’s analysis revealed that 40.1% of samples 
collected were contaminated with more than 5 parts per billion (“ppb”) of lead.
61
  
As the study could not target “worst case” homes with lead plumbing, as is 
required for EPA sampling, researchers extrapolated from the samples to 
determine that Flint’s ninetieth percentile lead value was 25ppb, greatly 
exceeding EPA’s allowed level of 15ppb for high-risk homes.
62
 
On September 8, 2015, after more than a year of residents’ complaints and 
officials’ undisclosed concerns about the safety of the Flint River water,
63
 
Virginia Tech posted the results of the 252 samples to FlintWaterStudy.org, 
finally bringing desperately needed transparency to the water crisis.
64
  Shortly 
thereafter, the director of the pediatric residency program at the Hurley Medical 
Center, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, reported in a press conference that the 
proportion of children with elevated blood lead levels increased since Flint 
 
 58. Notice from Mike Gasglow, Assistant Supervisor, Flint Water Plant to City of Flint (Jan. 
2, 2015), https://www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/uploads/TTHM-Notification-Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PL5-AAH6].   
 59. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 18. 
 60. Flint Water Study Updates: Lead Testing Results for Water Sampled by Residents, 
FLINTWATERSTUDY.ORG (Dec. 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/information-for-flint-
residents/results-for-citizen-testing-for-lead-300-kits/ [https://perma.cc/CPT7-UVXD].  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 16-20 (explaining the timeline 
of key events as the crisis in Flint was realized). 
 64. Marc Edwards, Siddhartha Roy & William Roads, Lead testing results for water sampled 
by residents, FLINTWATERSTUDY.ORG (Sept. 8, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/information-for-
flint-residents/results-for-citizen-testing-for-lead-300-kits/ [https://perma.cc/CPT7-UVXD] 
(Virginia Tech researchers asserted: “[M]athematically, even if the remaining 48 samples returned 
have non-detectable lead . . . FLINT HAS A VERY SERIOUS LEAD IN WATER PROBLEM.”).  
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stopped piping Detroit’s water.
65
  After the Detroit Free Press published an 
analysis of Flint blood lead tests, corroborating Dr. Hannah-Attisha’s findings, 
the Michigan Department of Health & Human Services (“MDHHS”) issued a 
statement confirming that Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s report was correct.
66
 
Just two weeks later, Governor Snyder, unable to escape the reality of the 
cost-cutting measure employed in 2014, worked with Mayor Walling to 
reconnect Flint to the Detroit Water Department’s water supply.
67
  Though 
orthophosphate treatment to rebuild pipes’ protective scale and chlorine 
monitoring have reduced pathogen and lead contamination, unfiltered water is 
still unsafe to drink.
68
  As a result, a city uniquely positioned in close proximity 
to the Great Lakes, an abundant supply of fresh water, is facing seemingly 
insurmountable challenges to providing safe water to its community.
69
 
B. The expense of curtailing expenses 
Ironically, not only has the city’s cost-saving measure proven expensive for 
Flint residents, but it has also forced the State to make expenditures it sought to 
avoid.  Whereas Flint officials estimated the cost of buying water from Detroit to 
be $16 million,
70
 the American Society of Civil Engineers estimated in 2009 that 
$13.8 billion would need to be spent to improve the State’s drinking water 
infrastructure by 2029.
71
  Although Detroit offered to reconnect Flint to Detroit’s 
system in January 2015, the current EFM declined because it would cost Flint an 
 
 65. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 21. 
 66. Id. (citing Robin Erb, Number of Flint Children with Lead Poisoning Jumps After Flint 
Water Switch, Says Researcher, DET. FREE PRESS (Sept. 25, 2015, 6:44 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/24/water-lead-in-flint/72747696/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5CS-Q8SZ]).  
 67. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 45, at 21. 
 68. See Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 217 F. Supp. 2d 960, 980 (E.D. Mich. 
2016) (ordering Flint to deliver bottled water to Flint households without properly installed and 
maintained faucet filters); MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLOOD LEVEL TEST RESULTS 
FOR SELECTED FLINT ZIP CODES (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/flintwater/Flint_Blood_Testing_Report_26Feb16_515770_
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/28U3-LSHL]; Nana Adwoa Antwi-Boasiako & Gretchen Frazee, Lead 
Removal From Flint Water Making Progress, Researchers Find, PBS (Aug. 11, 2016, 1:51 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/lead-flint-water/ [https://perma.cc/TNU9-9BVP] (noting 
that 54% of homes surveyed had detectable levels of lead in July 2016, as compared to 93% of 
homes surveyed in August 2015); Livengood, supra note 46. 
 69. See 2009 Report Card for Michigan’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS (2009), 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/michigan/michigan-overview/ [https://perma.cc/TVK8-
2TC7] (highlighting that in 2009, Michigan received a grade of a “D” on its 2009 infrastructure 
report and suggesting that failure to improve will lead to disastrous results in the future).  
 70. Is Detroit Being Poisoned Through Its Water?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 4, 2015, 2:02 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2978777/Protests-water-taste-smell-city-breaks-tie-
Detroit.html [https://perma.cc/3R5V-WZUC].  
 71. 2009 Report Card for Michigan’s Infrastructure, supra note 69. 
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additional $12 million per year.
72
  By October 2015, however, Snyder was forced 
to commit $3.5 million of the city’s funds to pay for water filters, free lead testing, 
and staff to conduct health exposure monitoring of lead in public water.
73
  As of 
February 2016, Snyder estimated that the State was facing a staggering bill of 
more than $7.5 million to replace Flint’s water in addition to $1.5 billion to 
improve the city’s infrastructure on an accelerated time table.
74
  Professor Richard 
Luthy, a Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, 
lamented: “The shame in all of this is they could have avoided the problem at low 
cost.  Instead, money that could have gone to much-needed schools, social 




Accordingly, the administration’s attempt to end a recurring cycle of 
budgetary deficits has transferred costs to private citizens.  In the case of Flint 
resident Ms. Mays, a lead plaintiff in a recently filed class action lawsuit, the 
city’s issuance of an order requiring citizens to boil tap water led her family to 
spend $400 per month on bottled water and filters to avoid continued adverse 
health effects.
76
  This additional cost was added to bills for polluted tap water, 
which ranged from $120 to $140 per month, eight times the national average for 
theoretically unpolluted water.
77
  Although the National Guard has distributed 
free water bottles to residents, many water stations limit households to one 
twenty-four pack of water per week, which is insufficient to meet the needs of 
families who require clean water for cooking, cleaning, drinking, and bathing.
78
 
Because water bills consume two percent of an average Flint household’s 
income, residents have begun ignoring unaffordable bills for “expensive poison,” 
perpetuating the cycle of debt as the city loses revenue from nonpayment and 
increased collection costs.
79
  While Flint officials have sought forgivable loans 
 
 72. Detroit Water Department Offers to Reconnect Flint to System, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 
21, 2015, 6:28 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20150121/NEWS01/150129965/detroit-
water-department-offers-to-reconnect-flint-to-system [https://perma.cc/9A28-CRE5].  
 73. Lax Oversight, Manipulated Data Led to Flint Water Crisis, Researcher Says, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, (Oct. 8, 2015, 4:36 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2015/10/08/lax-water-system-oversight-
manipulated-data-lead-to-public-health-crisis-in-flint-researcher-says/ [https://perma.cc/GM4Y-
QJGW].  
 74. Gov. Snyder Estimates It Will Cost $767,419,500 to Replace Flint’s Water Supply, CNN 
WIRE, (Feb. 3, 2016, 2:49 PM), http://wtvr.com/2016/02/03/gov-snyder-estimates-it-will-cost-
767419500-to-replace-flints-water-system/ [https://perma.cc/3TG5-E4VB]; Kane & Puentes, supra 
note 30. 
 75. Jordan, supra note 46. 
 76. Smith, supra note 25. 
 77. Bryce Covert, Flint Ignored a Memo on How to Make Water Cheaper, THINK PROGRESS 
(Jan. 27, 2016, 10:13 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2016/01/27/3743059/flint-water-
crisis-affordability/ [https://perma.cc/Y3KU-VTNS].  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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from the state and the federal government, the Michigan legislature appropriated 
$9 million in January 2016, two-thirds of the $12 million cost to reconnect Flint’s 
water supply to Lake Huron.
80
  In conformity with Flint’s approach to financial 




III. POTENTIAL MEANS OF DIRECT COMPENSATION FOR FLINT 
RESIDENTS 
With thousands of Flint children put at risk of lead poisoning, numerous 
reports of additional health problems, $1.5 billion in corroded pipes and water 
heaters, and failures at every level of government, Flint residents and nonprofit 
organizations have turned to the courts to seek restitution and recovery from state 
and local government officials.
82
  As each day passes, additional class action and 
individual suits are filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan and the Michigan Court of Claims seeking compensation for the 
economic and physical injuries caused by the EFM’s decision to switch Flint’s 
water supply in April 2014.
83
  Given the number of challenges that must be 
addressed to succeed through litigation and the dire state of Flint’s finances, 
concurrent state and private victims’ compensation funds (“VCF”) are the best 
available means of direct compensation for Flint residents.  A federal VCF 
modeled after the 9/11 Fund would be the ideal legal tool to provide Flint 
residents with direct compensation.  However, as three years have passed since 
the initial insurgence of the water crisis, it is clear that Congress lacks the financial 
motivations that spurred the adoption of federal legislation implementing the 9/11 
 
 80. Livengood, supra note 46. 
 81. Lederman, supra note 49; Kathleen Gray, Legislature Extends Flint Emergency 
Declaration, DET. FREE PRESS (Apr. 13, 2016, 6:16 PM) (highlighting that in addition to the funds 
granted to reconnect the city’s water supply to the Detroit Water and Sewage Department system, 
the State legislature has approved $67 million in a state emergency funds, and the federal 
government, to date, has provided $5 million in an emergency declaration). http://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/04/13/legislature-extends-flint-emergency-
declaration/82989030/ [https://perma.cc/EBS2-GVVS]. 
 82. See Laura Bliss, How Will Flint Residents Ever Be Compensated? CITY LAB (Jan. 27, 
2016), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2016/01/flint-water-crisis-compensation-bills/426912/ 
[https://perma.cc/D9HC-8JWC] (examining the possibilities that Flint residents could be 
compensated via lawsuits, emergency aid, no-fault compensation, consumer protections or serious 
form).  
 83. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Abney v. Lockwood, No. 16-10678 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2016) 
(personal injury suit) (seeking compensatory and punitive damages for injuries caused to Flint 
children due to the alleged “negligence, dereliction of duty, and lies that resulted in a public health 
crisis of historic proportions”); Complaint at 2, Mays v. Snyder, No. 15-14002 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 
2015) (class action suit) (seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as well as money damages for state 
or municipal employees’ alleged violations of plaintiffs’ due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment while acting under color of state law). 
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Fund.  Accordingly, a dual state-private compensation scheme incorporating 
elements of the 9/11 Fund is a more realistic method of directly compensating 
Flint residents for physical and economic harms suffered. 
A. Recourse through litigation 
On the face of things, it appears that the residents of Flint must succeed in a 
mass tort action against government officials who failed to fulfill their duty of 
protecting the health and safety of the community.
84
  The plaintiffs, the majority 
of whom are children poisoned by lead-contaminated water, are undeniably 
sympathetic.  Moreover, in light of evidence that Flint officials recognized the 
toxicity of the Flint water supply, it can hardly be said that the Flint administration 
was not negligent for placing the health of young children at risk.
85
  However, the 
people of Flint face potentially insurmountable obstacles to recovering 
compensatory and punitive damages through the court system.  Specifically, 
Stanford Law School Professor Nora Freeman noted that both class action and 
individual plaintiffs face two prominent challenges to recovery: sovereign 
immunity and proving specific causation.
86
  Before Flint class action claimants 
seek to overcome these challenges to success on the merits, however, they must 
successfully move for class certification, which is unlikely under the 
circumstances. 
1. Hurdles to class certification 
The threshold issue to pursuing monetary relief through class action practice 
in the mass tort context is whether a class will satisfy the requirements for 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or the equivalent rule in 
Michigan.
87
  As of June 2017, no plaintiffs’ class has been certified in a class 
 
 84. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Courts Will Fail Flint, Too, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL 
AGGREGATE (Mar. 10, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/03/10/the-courts-will-fail-flint-too/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZPQ4-KDTF] (explaining that the causation requirement may prevent many tort 
victims of Flint from receiving compensation). 
 85. Shannon Driscoll, The Flint Water Crisis: Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom Answers 
Critical Legal Questions, STAN. L. SCH.: LEGAL AGGREGATE (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://law.stanford.edu/2016/02/16/the-flint-water-crisis-professor-nora-freeman-engstrom-
answers-critical-legal-questions/ [https://perma.cc/XK9M-L8D8].  
 86. See id. (addressing how sovereign immunity could act as an impediment to holding the City 
of Flint liable). 
 87. Although the majority of class actions have been filed in federal courts, at least one federal 
class action has been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Flint claimants re-filed suit in 
state court, where the State’s substantive equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 would govern.  See Jennifer 
Chambers, Federal Judge Dismisses Class Action Lawsuit Over Flint, DET. NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016, 
3:52 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/04/19/flint-
class-action-lawsuit/83229426/ [https://perma.cc/Z7DH-3L3K] (citing Order of Dismissal for Lack 
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action brought against the State, local officials, the MDEQ, MDHHS, or other 
contributors to the water crisis for physical harm, though numerous proposed 
class actions have been filed.
88
  Because courts are often hesitant to certify classes 
in mass tort actions where monetary damages are the primary relief sought, the 




For a class to be certified for monetary relief, the class must satisfy the 
requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
90
  The Flint claimants seeking class 
certification may satisfy the requirements of 23(a), but 23(b)(3), which requires 
predominance and superiority, will present significant difficulties.  Under Rule 
23(a), a class must satisfy four requirements: numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy of representation.  To satisfy the numerosity 
requirement, a class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable.
91
  As joinder is considered impracticable and numerosity satisfied 
where a putative class numbers at least 40, numerosity will be met by Flint 
claimants, particularly considering the 100,000 residents similarly affected by the 
contaminated water supply.
92
  Commonality is satisfied if there are questions of 
law or fact common to the class.
93
  Because the Flint claimants can point to a 
common action or policy leading to their injuries—the decision of the EFM to 
switch the water supply as a cost saving measure—this requirement will likely 
be satisfied as well.  Typicality is satisfied where the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.
94
  Since a claim is typical 
if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct, the Flint 
 
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Boler v. Earley, No. 16-10323 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2016), ECF No. 
56); MICH. CT. R. 3.501; see also Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C., No. 16-2313, 
2016 WL 6777325, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 2016) (remanding proposed class action of Flint residents 
and property owners alleging state-law professional negligence to state court where local controversy 
exception of the Class Action Fairness Act applied).  
 88. See Annie Baxter, Lawsuits Pile Up Over Flint Water Crisis, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 20, 2016, 
6:00 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/01/20/world/lawsuits-pile-over-flint-water-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/9YQT-693J] (describing lawsuits filed against state and local public officials and 
public entities in Michigan).  
 89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (providing that a 
“‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class 
action because of the likelihood that significant questions . . . of damages . . . of liability and defenses 
to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an 
action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate into multiple lawsuits separately 
tried.”). 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (b).  
 91. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 92. See Oplechenski v. Parfums Givenchi, 254 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding that joinder 
is impracticable when class members number at least forty). 
 93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
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claimants should succeed on this point as well.
95
 
The last prong—adequacy of representation—will present the greatest 
challenge to Flint claimants.  The inquiry into adequacy of representation 
determines whether the representative parties will adequately protect the interests 
of the class.
96
  There are two elements to representational adequacy: first, the 
representative parties must have no significant interests which are antagonistic to 
other members of the class; and second, the attorney must be capable of 
prosecuting the instant claim with some degree of expertise.
97
  In a case where a 
subset of plaintiffs have been exposed to a toxic substance, but have not yet 
manifested injury, courts have found that there is an intra-class conflict requiring 
sub-classes and separate attorneys.
98
  Even though current complaints in proposed 
Flint class actions have defined their classes narrowly—such as children exposed 
to lead contaminated water below a certain age—the proposed classes will have 
difficulty fulfilling this requirement. 
In addition to satisfying the requirements of 23(a), the putative class 
members in an action for damages must also satisfy the 23(b)(3) requirements of 
predominance and superiority to achieve class certification.  Under Rule 23(b)(3), 
an action may be maintained as a class action if “[t]he court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over 
any questions involving individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.”
99
  Here, the core dispute is the decision to switch the source of 
Flint’s water; however, individual issues will likely predominate over common 
questions, making certification unlikely.  In particular, individuals’ medical 
histories, the amount of water each individual consumed, and the duration of 
consumption, among other individualized determinations, will swamp common 
issues. 
On the other hand, as this is not a multi-jurisdictional dispute involving 
varying state laws, and courts retain broad powers of equity to ensure that those 
harmed may recover, the predominance inquiry will likely rise or fall with the 
particular judge hearing the matter.  With regard to superiority, plaintiffs with 
demonstrated injuries from lead poisoning will be able to find attorneys willing 
to represent them on individual matters, undermining the need for class treatment.  
At the same time, given the number of individuals claiming adverse health effects 
from the conduct of the same defendants, a judge may find that it is in the interest 
 
 95. Oplechenski, 254 F.R.D. at 489.  
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 97. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 98. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 815 (1999) (finding that a class divided between 
holders of present and future claims requires division into homogenous subclasses under 23(c)(5), 
with separate representation to eliminate conflicting interest of class counsel). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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of fairness and efficiency to allow certification.  Again, as this is a fact-intensive 
inquiry that may be swayed by the court’s inherent equitable authority, the 
putative classes’ success will likely hinge on the particular judges hearing the 
cases. 
Litigation arising from lead contamination in Washington, D.C. 
demonstrates the difficulty of achieving class certification in the mass tort 
context.  In Parkhurst v. D.C. Water and Sewer Authority, for example, the 
parents of seven children brought suit against the D.C. Water and Sewer 
Authority (D.C. Water) for supplying tap water with elevated levels of lead to 
D.C. homes from 2000 to 2004.
100
  The plaintiffs alleged that numerous children 
six years and younger consumed tap water that passed through lines containing 
lead, that blood tests found blood lead levels of 10 micrograms per deciliter or 
higher (µg/dL), that the exposure to lead caused or would cause cognitive 
problems, and that D.C. Water did not adequately warn the public about the lead 
contamination and attendant health risks.
101
  Accordingly, the proposed class 
seeking certification was defined as children who, from 2000 to 2004, were six 
years or younger, residents of D.C. and consumed water supplied by D.C. Water 




Despite the narrow class definition in Parkhurst, the court denied the 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their 
burden of proving identifiability, numerosity, typicality, adequacy of 
representation, predominance, and superiority.
103
  With regard to identifiability, 
the court found that the class definition was overly broad and amorphous because 
records kept by the D.C. Department of Health and D.C. Water would not provide 
a readily ascertainable means of determining the current locations of children 
who had elevated blood lead levels from 2000 to 2004 or the location of specific 
homes served by lead lines.
104
  To demonstrate numerosity, the plaintiffs relied 
on a study by Professor Edwards—the same professor who conducted research 
of lead contamination in Flint—for the proposition that “at least 1,000 children 
under seven developed elevated blood-lead levels during the Class Period.”
105
  As 
the study did not provide a basis for determining a reasonably specific estimate 
of the class size, the court struck down the plaintiffs’ use of this study as 
insufficient to establish numerosity.
106
  In an overlapping analysis of 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, the court determined 
 
 100. Parkhurst et al. v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 2013 WL 1438094, at *1 (D.C. Super. Apr. 
8, 2013). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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that the individualized proof necessary to determine class members’ individual 
injuries and the latency of lead poisoning, as many putative class members had 
not yet exhibited injuries, made certification inappropriate.
107
 
Indeed, the court noted the difficulty of seeking certification in a class action 
for damages in a mass tort case.  In its analysis of the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy 
the predominance requirement, the court noted, “[D]ifferent class members were 
exposed to different statements [from D.C. Water], different amounts of lead, for 
different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods; some . . . 
suffer no physical injury, while others suffer from significant cognitive or 
behavioral problems . . . .”
108
  As a result, the individual issues concerning 
causation and damages negated any common issues of law or fact.
109
  With regard 
to superiority of class treatment, the court found that the plaintiffs’ ability to 
pursue individual causes of action from manifested injury; the presence of other 
litigation based on substantially similar claims; and the manageability issues 




Just as the D.C. plaintiffs faced substantial challenges in seeking class 
certification in their action against D.C. Water, Flint claimants will similarly have 
difficulty achieving class certification in actions against Flint authorities.  
Although the time elapsed between the water contamination and the date of filing 
suit weighed heavily in the Parkhurst court’s determination that plaintiffs failed 
to satisfy their burden of proving the elements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 
23(b)(3), the fact that Flint residents have filed suit almost immediately is 
unlikely to merit certification.  As putative class members must satisfy all six 
requirements of 23(a) and (b)(3) in damages class actions, the need for complex 
individualized determinations of liability, causation, and damages due will likely 
preclude federal district courts in Michigan from granting certification.  
Moreover, the ever-growing number of individual suits, as well as individuals’ 
ability to bring suit due to manifested injuries from lead poisoning, may lead 
courts to conclude that class treatment is not warranted. 
 
 107. Id. (quoting Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (“Class representatives 
who are ‘currently injured’ and want ‘generous immediate payouts’ may not be adequate 
representatives of ‘exposure-only plaintiffs’ who have an interest ‘in ensuring an ample, inflation-
protected fund for the future.’”)). 
 108. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 625). 
 109. Id. (citing Page v. Phila. Housing Auth., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15563, at *9-12 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 18, 2003) (denying a motion for class certification of a class of children exposed to lead paint 
in subsidized housing because the individual issues of exposure and medical needs precluded 
certification)). 
 110. Id. 
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2. Obstacles to success on the merits 
In both individual and class action suits, the largest challenge that litigants 
face is the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
rooted in the maxim “the king can do no wrong,” shields federal and state 
government officials acting in their official capacities from tort liability.
111
  
Although the Safe Drinking Water Act includes a provision for citizen suits, 
providing a loophole around the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the provision 
only allows citizens to seek injunctive relief against governmental entities, not 
damages.
112
  Moreover, while the city itself is not immune from suit, the current 
state of the city’s finances makes monetary recovery infeasible.
113
  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will continue to preclude Flint tort claimants 
from receiving compensatory and punitive monetary awards from state or local 
officials. 
Further, even if Flint claimants could break through the somewhat 
impenetrable shield of sovereign immunity, they will have great difficulty 
proving specific causation.
114
  To establish standing in a toxic tort matter, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that lead exposure caused individuals’ injuries by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
115
  It is particularly difficult to establish specific 
causation in the context of lead exposure, as the behavioral and cognitive 
impairments caused by lead may be attributed to many other causes.  As a result, 
even though plaintiffs may circumvent sovereign immunity by alleging that 
public officials were grossly negligent—another exception to governmental 
insulation from liability—“traditional tort suits targeting the state of Michigan are 
very unlikely to get off the ground” because of the obstacles to proving specific 
causation.
116
  Specifically, “[i]n lead contamination cases, the question always 
arises:  Is this kid’s failure to thrive really due to lead exposure—or might it be 
the consequence of . . . unlucky genes, a chaotic home environment, or poor 
prenatal care?”
117
  Although general causation may be established because there 
is no doubt that lead is capable of causing the type of injuries alleged by Flint 
claimants,
118
 the impediments to proving specific causation will likely prevent 
 
 111. See FREDERICK W. PONTIUS, DRINKING WATER REGULATION AND HEALTH 549-50 (2003); 
Engstrom, supra note 84. 
 112. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (West 1986) (allowing a court to issue an injunction and a civil 
penalty no greater than $25,000 “as protection of public health may require”). 
 113. Engstrom, supra note 84; see also Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 217 F. 
Supp. 2d 960, 979 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (granting Flint residents’ motion for preliminary injunction to 
provide Flint households with safe drinking water arising from State’s alleged violation of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act). 
 114. Engstrom, supra note 84. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Book Note, Causation in Environmental Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 2261 (2015) 
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victims from achieving relief through litigation. 
3. Compensation through the Fourteenth Amendment 
The saving grace for litigants may be the constitutional claim that state and 
local officials’ malfeasance deprived Flint residents of their rights to bodily 
integrity without due process of law in violation of the federal and state 
constitutions.
119
  A “crack in the sovereign immunity shield,”
120
 federal suits may 
be brought for constitutional violations, such as the alleged violations of citizens’ 
rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Relying 
upon a novel legal theory rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, multiple class 
actions have alleged that the federal and state constitutions impliedly prohibit 
violations of bodily integrity from contaminated water.
121
 
The right to be free from unwanted interference of one’s person is well-
established in American jurisprudence.
122
  However, Flint claimants have 
creatively departed from the traditional doctrine to liken the consumption of 
contaminated water to a compelled surgical intrusion into one’s body, which the 
Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional on several occasions.
123
  Although 
this is arguably directly comparable, as forcing individuals to drink contaminated 
tap water parallels forced physical intrusions, it is nonetheless a novel theory.  As 
a result, this theory poses another impediment to Flint claimants’ ability to 
recover in the courtroom because the novelty of a claim is a factor that weighs 
against class certification.
124
  Overall, even though the constitutional argument is 
an end-run around sovereign immunity, it presents alternative obstacles to 
compensatory relief through litigation, particularly in the class action context. 
 
(quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., No. 95-7657, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1997) 
(“[G]eneral causation addresses whether [products] of the same nature as [the] defendant’s product 
are capable of causing the type of injuries alleged . . . .”)). 
 119. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (West); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. CONST. ART. I, § 17 (West). 
 120. Engstrom, supra note 84. 
 121. See, e.g., Mays v. Snyder, No. 16-000017-MM (Mich. Ct. Cl. Nov. Oct. 26, 2016) 
(permitting proposed class of Flint residents to sue state officials for alleged violations of state 
constitutional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unconstitutional taking of property). 
 122. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990). 
 123. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (finding that forcing a suspect to 
vomit to extract narcotics tablets shocked the conscience in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 124. See Castano v. The American Tobacco, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a class 
action because the novelty of the tort claim rendered the tort premature, precluding a finding of 
superiority as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). 
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B. Victims’ Compensation Funds 
1. Federal compensation fund 
As Flint claimants face significant challenges to recovering through 
litigation, a VCF that operates outside of the tort system is more likely to provide 
Flint residents with the damages they seek, although not without its own 
difficulties.  Aside from sending financial aid to Genesee County, Congress could 
enact a no-fault compensation plan that would settle all claims brought by 
aggrieved Flint residents and compensate them for death, physical injury, and 
property damages.
125
  This method of compensation was most notably utilized to 
compensate family members of victims killed in the September 11 terrorist 
attacks. At a cost of approximately $7 billion to taxpayers, surviving family 
members received as much as $7.1 million.
126
  Personal injury victims received 
even larger payouts, reaching $8.6 million.
127
 
Though a federal VCF could provide Flint residents with a viable alternative 
to tort litigation, federal legislation creating a VCF for Flint modeled after the 
9/11 Fund is unlikely to be enacted.  In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, Congress moved quickly to pass legislation establishing the fund in part 
because of looming financial concerns that affected the national economy.  On 
September 14, 2001, the House and the Senate passed the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 (“the Act”)
128
 as a solution to the 
impending liquidation of the airline industry after the Federal Aviation Agency 
grounded all airplanes and closed all airspace above the United States in response 
to the September 11 attacks.
129
  Out of concern that large-scale litigation would 
further cripple the nation’s airline industry, Congress added a VCF to the Act to 
limit victims’ rights to sue the airlines for negligence.
130
  Not only did the fund 
 
 125. Bliss, supra note 82. 
 126. John Culhane, What Does Justice Require for the Victims of Katrina and September 11?, 
10.2 DEPAUL J. OF HEALTH CARE L. 177, 178 (2007) (citing the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001, which is codified in Title IV of the Air Transportation Safety and 
System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 401-08, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (West 2001)). 
 127. Kenneth R. Feinberg et al., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, 109 (2001).  For another example of a federally funded 
compensation scheme, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-00-165R, LOGAN SINKING 
HOMES 1-2 (2000) (describing Philadelphia’s use of HUD’s Community Development Block Grants 
and Special Purpose Grants to fund the city’s acquisition of Logan Triangle and the relocation of 
residents after residences built on ash and cinder landfill began to sink). 
 128. 49 U.S.C. § 401 (2001). 
 129. Erin G. Holt, The September 11 Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui 
Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513, 513 (2004) (citing 147 CONG. REC. H5684-85 
(2001)). 
 130. Id.; see also KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER 
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 41-42 (2012) (describing Congress’s efforts to limit the 
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seek to compensate victims, but it also provided up to $15 billion in cash and loan 
guarantees to compensate airlines for costs incurred from September 11.
131
  
Further incentivizing Congress to establish the fund, the Act deducted collateral 
compensation outside of charitable donations from victims’ awards.
132
  As a 




Because the fund operated outside of the tort system, requiring claimants to 
waive their right to private litigation, it was successful in deterring costly 
litigation against the airlines.  Specifically, 97% of the 2880 potential tort 
claimants who could have brought suit for the death of a victim and 2860 injured 
survivors opted to apply to the fund rather than file suit.
134
  As the Act established 
an exclusive cause of action for claims “arising out of the hijacking and 
subsequent crashes” of September 11, the Act limited recovery against the airline 




The fact that the 9/11 Fund operated outside of, rather than concurrently 
with, the tort system benefited both the government and recipients.  The fund 
provided numerous advantages to claimants to tort litigation.  For example, 
claimants’ awards were often greater than they would have been through tort 
litigation, lawyers’ costs and fees to assist claimants to apply to the fund were 
marginal compared to the potential costs and contingent fees associated with tort 
litigation, and survivors and decedents’ families were guaranteed recovery from 
the fund.
136
  Further, whereas applicants received funds quickly, as all 
compensation had been paid out by 2004, many of the tort suits did not settle until 
2007.
137
  By providing applicants with speedy recovery, closure, and the ability 
to avoid the emotional stress of tort litigation, the 9/11 Fund successfully 
achieved its objectives of providing direct compensation to victims while 
protecting the national economy. 
In stark contrast to the federal government’s efforts to create a fund in 
response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, however, Congress failed to enact a 
 
financial liabilities of the airlines in tort litigation and provide adequate funding for the 
families of victims); Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of 
Damage Compensation 29 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 09-005, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371784 [https://perma.cc/X5M8-VDDW].  
 131. Lempert, supra note 130, at 28. 
 132. Id. at 29. 
 133. Id. at 30. 
 134. Id. at 29-30 (citation omitted). 
 135. Holt, supra note 129, at 514 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 408(a)); see also Feinberg, supra 
note 127, at 42 (noting that Title IV of the Act provided victims with the option of either filing 
suit in federal court in New York or waiving their rights to sue and opting onto a publicly 
funded compensation program where they would not need to prove defendants’ liability).  
 136. Lempert, supra note 130, at 30-31. 
 137. Id. at 31 (citation omitted). 
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similar fund for the victims of Hurricane Katrina three years after the September 
11 attacks.  The distinction lies in part in the localized nature of Hurricane Katrina 
in comparison to the September 11 terrorist attacks, which Congress viewed as 
an attack on the nation as a whole.  The discrepancy also lies in the party 
responsible; whereas government actors’ wrongful conduct was responsible for 
infrastructural and emergency response shortfalls of Hurricane Katrina, “social 
risk” was to blame for the devastation of 9/11.
138
  As societal forces, such as 
terrorism or contagious disease, are borne and shared by an entire society, 
distributive justice constrains available compensation for individuals because the 
needs and resources of the entire population must be considered.
139
  Conversely, 
where wrongful conduct causes individuals harm, such aggrieved persons may 
be compensated from the entirety of the resources of the culpable party.
140
  In the 
context of Hurricane Katrina, government officials were to blame for their failure 
to construct and maintain a levee system, plan for evacuation, and effectively 
communicate and engage in timely response efforts when evacuation became 
necessary in New Orleans.
141
  As Hurricane Katrina theoretically impacted a 
small subset of the population due to the wrongful conduct of a group of 
government officials, Congress was not called to action as it was in the case of 
9/11, where the entire country was affected by a force that could not be attributed 
to domestic, private actors. 
Just as private actors (albeit acting in an official capacity) were allegedly to 
blame for the harm suffered by New Orleans residents in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, Michigan and Flint officials committed “wrongful conduct” 
at the expense of the Flint community.  Accordingly, there is a looming concern 
that just as with Hurricane Katrina, the Flint water crisis will not spur Congress 
into action to provide a no-fault compensation plan for Flint residents.  Indeed, 
Stanford Law Professor and torts specialist Robert L. Rabin has referenced 
Congress’ failure to establish a no-fault compensation plan for victims of 
Hurricane Katrina as evidence that establishing a compensation fund “is just 
really difficult as a policy matter.”
142
  Confirming Professor Rabin’s concerns, 
Kenneth Feinberg, the preeminent authority on compensation funds for mass tort 
victims and the administrator of the 9/11 Fund, is skeptical that such a fund will 




 138. Culhane, supra note 126, at 179; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Designing Compensatory 
Funds: In Search of First Principles, 3 STAN J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 19-20 (Winter 2015) (“Similar to 
natural disaster catastrophes, when a wrongdoer is unavailable to provide remediation, 
communitarian values may then prompt provision of aid to the distressed.”).  
 139. Culhane, supra note 126, at 178. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Bliss, supra note 82. 
 143. David Bailey, Despite Spotlight, Proving Flint Lead Damages No Slam Dunk, REUTERS 
(Apr. 18, 2016, 2:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-michigan-water-lawsuits-
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Highlighting the hurdles to proving a causal link between physical injuries and 
lead contamination, Feinberg asked: “How long do you monitor them?” and “If 




Validating academics’ apprehension about Congress establishing a federal 
VCF, lobbyists’ efforts to push Congress to create a fund to compensate victims 
have fallen short.  Though the Water Resources Development Act did pass both 
houses in the final days of the 114th Congress, the bill will not provide direct 
compensation for Flint residents who were harmed by drinking contaminated 
water.
145
  Instead, the bill authorizes $100 million in grants to states such as 
Michigan that are enduring drinking water emergencies and $70 million to 
subsidize state loans for water infrastructure development.
146
  Though Congress’s 
initiative was a long-awaited start to help Flint recover from eighteen months of 
unusable city water at the time of its enactment, the federal government has not 
offered victims in Flint the direct, tax-free compensation that victims of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks received.
147
 
Though academics agree that a federal VCF would be the ideal mechanism 
to secure sufficient relief for victims of the Flint water crisis in lieu of tort 
recovery, establishing a federal VCF is not without its challenges, particularly 
political gridlock without national financial concerns motivating swift action.
148
  
A federal VCF would surmount the obstacles to recovery for personal injuries 
and prevent the city and the State from expending its limited resources to defend 
against citizen suits.
149
  Moreover, a VCF is particularly appropriate in this case 
because it could account for the latency of injuries from lead contamination, 




idUSKCN0XF0CS [https://perma.cc/R2RW-NJR4].  
 144. Id. 
 145. Water Resources Development Act, S. 2848, 114th Cong. (2016); Emmarie 
Huetteman, Congress Approves Spending Bill, Averting Government Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/congress-shutdown-flint-
spending.html [https://perma.cc/DEX4-VHYA].  
 146. Coral Davenport, Senate Approves Funding for Flint Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/us/politics/flint-michigan-water-
senate-aid.html [https://perma.cc/KH92-9H7R]. See also Catherine Ho, Hope Fades for 
Compensation for Flint Residents—For Now, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/27/hope-fades-for-
compensation-for-flint-residents-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/K38R-UNGY].  
 147. Maya Rockeymoore, Obama Should Propose a 9/11-Style Fund for Flint, TIME 
(May 4, 2016), http://time.com/4317690/obama-flint-visit/ [https://perma.cc/D3ET-DBSB].  
 148. See Feinberg, supra note 127, at 60 (stating that the 9/11 Fund should not serve as 
precedent, as “Congress certainly has expressed no interest in replicating the fund to deal with 
other natural or man-made disasters”). 
 149. Interview by Ryan Grimes with Noah Hall, Professor, Wayne St. Univ. L. Sch., in Ann 
Arbor, Mich. (Mar. 11, 2016). 
 150. See generally Paul Heaton, Ivan Waggoner & Jamie Morikawa, Victim Compensation 
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However, in light of the unique circumstances necessary for Congress to enact a 
fund modeled after the 9/11 Fund, Congress is unlikely to enact a federal VCF to 
provide direct compensation to Flint residents. 
2. State and private compensation funds 
Because a Congressionally-created VCF may not be a feasible source of 
direct funds for potential Flint claimants considering the localized nature of the 
tragedy, a dual public-private compensation scheme is a practicable alternative.
151
  
As Professor Noah Hall of Wayne State University School of Law affirmed, 
“[I]nstead of the state investing its money in lawyers to fight the citizens . . . the 
state would be better off putting its money into a compensation fund . . . and 
moving forward with solutions and compensation.”
152
  Accordingly, in lieu of a 
federally-supported fund analogous to the 9/11 Fund, a fund—or, funds—
generated by state taxes and donations from private parties may provide Flint 




While academics have focused on providing Flint residents with a federal 
compensation fund, a private fund that operates outside of the tort system in 
addition to a supplemental state fund may be a superior solution.  Such a state 
fund could provide relief to those who have not, and may not, suffer personal 
injuries.  Rather, a state fund could ensure that those who suffered purely 
economic loss from property damage due to corroded lead service lines would 
also be compensated.  Specifically, Governor Snyder and Flint Mayor Karen 
Weaver may learn from Boston and Massachusetts’ response to the Boston 
Marathon bombings and New Jersey’s enactment of the New Jersey Spill Fund 
to provide direct compensation for Flint residents.  In other words, a centralized 
 
Funds and Tort Litigation Following Incidents of Mass Violence, 63 BUFFALO L. REV. 1263 (2015) 
(discussing the implementation of VCFs as an alternative to tort litigation, particularly where 
claimants suffer latent injuries). 
 151. Note that while the Eastern District of Michigan has approved an $97 million 
settlement requiring the State of Michigan and the City of Flint to replace the lead pipes and 
galvanized steel service lines in Flint within three years, Flint residents have still not received 
any direct compensation.  Settlement Agreement at 6, Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. 
Khouri, No. 2:16-cv-10277-DML-SDD (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2017) (No. 147-1). 
 152. Interview with Noah Hall, supra note 149. 
 153. See John Culhane, Battery and Deprivation of Liberty, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2016, 12:37 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/01/flint_deserves_a_compens
ation_fund_for_its_drinking_water.html [https://perma.cc/KAN2-24U2] (advocating for the 
creation of a state compensation fund to provide recovery in proportion to delineated categories of 
harm); cf. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Unconventional Responses to Unique Catastrophes, 45 AKRON L. 
REV. 575, 576 n.7 (2012) (acknowledging that purely private compensation schemes, such as the 
private claims program established by private insurers to compensated insureds harmed by Hurricane 
Katrina, deprive recipients of administrative hearings critical to funds’ credibility).   
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VCF funded by private parties and a concurrent state VCF funded by state taxes 
will likely provide the greatest compensation to the greatest number of Flint 
residents as quickly as possible, so long as claimants are required to forgo private 
tort litigation analogous to the 9/11 Fund. 
3. Lessons from The One Fund and Massachusetts’s State Fund 
The efforts of the City of Boston and the State of Massachusetts to 
compensate those affected by the Boston Marathon bombings provide a template 
for a dual state and private compensation scheme in Flint.  In the aftermath of the 
bombings, former Boston Mayor Thomas M. Menino and former Massachusetts 
Governor Deval Patrick created The One Fund, a charitable organization, to 




The One Fund Boston model was an innovative alternative to traditional 
charitable models to compensate disaster victims.  Under this model, government 
involvement in a charitable organization provides an opportunity for the public 
and private sectors to collaborate to provide victims of disasters with direct, 
speedy relief.
155
  At the time of the Boston Marathon bombing, cities responded 
to mass violence by trusting an existing local foundation to collect private 
donations and administer funds to survivors and deceased victims’ families.
156
  
Though a preexisting organization would have the benefits of a paid staff and 
501(c)(3) status, city leaders recognized that channeling funds through existing 
foundations would not direct funds to survivors and families of victims as quickly 
as possible.
157
  Accordingly, less than one day after the Boston Marathon 
bombings, city officials filed papers to incorporate One Fund Boston, Inc.; 
 
 154. Susan L. Abbott & Lisa A.H. McChesney, Disaster Relief: The One Fund Boston Model, 
58 BOS. B.J. 22, 22 (2014) (hereinafter “Disaster Relief”). 
 155. Susan L. Abbott & Lisa A.H. McChesney, Creating A Disaster Relief Charity: The One 
Fund Boston Model, 25 TAX’N EXEMPTS 29, 33 (May-June 2014) (hereinafter “Creating A Disaster 
Relief Charity”). 
 156. Mitchell Weiss, Lessons from Boston’s Experiment with The One Fund, HARV. BUS. 
REV. 1 (Jan. 22, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/01/lessons-from-bostons-experiment-with-the-
one-fund [https://perma.cc/6FXG-HQ5F].  
 157. Id. (citing Dana Liebelson, Charts: Where Did the Money Donated to Columbine, 
Aurora, and Virginia Tech Mass-Shooting Victims Go?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 8, 2013, 5:00 
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/where-does-money-donated-victims-
mass-shootings-go [https://perma.cc/XWR4-P3UN]) (noting that victims of the 1999 
Columbine shooting did not receive funds for years, and the funds they did received 
amounted to only 58% of the funds collected)); see also Joshua Corie Yesnowitz, The One 
Fund Boston: Lessons for Leaders, BOS. UNIV. 1 (Aug. 2014), 
https://open.bu.edu/bitstream/handle/2144/8943/City%20Insights-
One%20Fund%20Boston_Lessons%20for%20Leaders.pdf?sequence=5 
[https://perma.cc/49TL-GQX3] (discussing the consequences of compensation funds). 
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opened bank accounts; and established a single vehicle to receive funds, 
connected to PayPal.
158
  By executive order of Mayor Menino, the city entrusted 
The One Fund Boston, Inc. to provide a single vehicle to collect community 
contributions to compensate victims of the Boston Marathon bombing and 
victims of attacks that may occur in the future.
159
  After Mayor Menino appointed 
two-thirds of The One Fund’s board of directors, The One Fund contacted local 
business for funds and recruited Kenneth Feinberg as administrator.
160
  As a result 
of the city’s unique compensation scheme, The One Fund collected nearly $61 




To expedite the release of funds to victims and their families, attorneys for 
The One Fund sought to apply for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status with the IRS on 
an expedited basis.
162
  The IRS does not allow an organization to distribute funds 
to individuals solely because they are victims of a disaster.
163
  Rather, funds must 
be provided only to recipients who lack adequate funds based on financial needs 
testing.
164
  Accordingly, the Fund’s need-blind distribution scheme was 
inconsistent with IRS policies.
165
 
To circumvent the barriers to tax-exempt status and avoid engaging in 
financial means testing for recipients, The One Fund attorneys worked with the 
IRS to satisfy criteria for 501(c)(3) status as a charitable organization that “lessens 
the burdens of government.”
166
  To establish that an organization lessens the 
burdens of government, the IRS first requires an objective manifestation by the 
government that it considers the activities the organization performs to be its 
burden.
167
  Then, the IRS will look at the specific circumstances of the case to 
determine if the organization actually relieves the government of an activity that 
the government would otherwise be forced to perform.
168
  After the IRS considers 
 
 158. Weiss, supra note 156. 
 159. Creating A Disaster Relief Charity, supra note 155, at 32.  
 160. Disaster Relief, supra note 154; Weiss, supra note 156. 
 161. Disaster Relief, supra note 154. 
 162. Id.  See also Internal Revenue Serv., Pub. No. 3833, DISASTER RELIEF: PROVIDING 
ASSISTANCE THROUGH CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 5 (revised 2014) (stating that a disaster 
relief organization may request expedited review of its Form 1023 by showing that “it is 
meeting an immediate need of disaster relief or emergency hardship victims and that its ability 
to prove immediate assistance to such victims will be adversely impacted in a material way” 
without expedited review).  
 163. Disaster Relief, supra note 154. 
 164. Id.; see also Pub. No. 3833, supra note 162, at 11 (providing that after the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster, a charity must provide funds to an indefinite list of beneficiaries based 
on an objective evaluation of the victims’ needs).  
 165. Disaster Relief, supra note 154. 
 166. Creating A Disaster Relief Charity, supra note 155, at 31 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) 
– 19(d)(2) (2014)).  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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the circumstances and determines that the organization’s activities actually lessen 
the burdens of government, it determines whether the organization serves private 
interests; if so, it must consider whether the public interests served by the 
organization outweigh benefits to private parties.
169
 
This was the first time this innovative technique has been employed in the 
disaster relief context.
170
  Notwithstanding, the IRS determined that The One 
Fund lessened the burdens of government in several ways, including by providing 
the structure to coordinate the collection, administration, and distribution of funds 
collected after the bombing.
171
  Therefore, as a result of state and municipal 
officials’ efforts, the IRS granted The One Fund 501(c)(3) status, leading The 
One Fund to disburse 100% of the $61 million collected and allowing recipients 
to avoid paying taxes on the millions of dollars of relief they received in 
accordance with a protocol developed by Feinberg.
172
  As The One Fund 
distributions were considered a gift, victims did not need to waive their rights to 
sue for injuries to be compensated, in stark contrast to the 9/11 Fund.
173
 
Those who qualified for The One Fund were limited to families of those 
killed, individuals who lost multiple limbs, those with permanent brain damage, 
single amputees, those who spent at least one night in the hospital, and those who 
received outpatient care on the day of the marathon.
174
  Though Mayor Menino 
and Governor Patrick aimed to create a single vehicle to collect and distribute 
funds to survivors and victims’ families, Massachusetts Attorney General Martha 
Coakley and the Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance (“MOVA”) sought 
to provide additional compensation for those affected by the bombings.
175
  
Accordingly, Attorney General Coakley and MOVA also administered a 
longstanding state fund to provide eligible victims and their families with 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Disaster Relief, supra note 154. 
 171. Creating A Disaster Relief Charity, supra note 155, at 33. 
 172. Disaster Relief, supra note 154; Treas. Reg. § 139 (exempting qualified disaster relief 
payments from federal income tax payments); see also Mark Arsenault & Todd Wallack, One Fund 
Payments Will Include Those Treated as Outpatients, BOS. GLOBE (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2013/05/15/one-fund-payments-will-include-those-treated-hospital-
outpatients/y0rsHCwTEgx5sJZJLARwiI/story.html [https://perma.cc/W4TC-EJUJ] (discussing the 
payment distribution scheme from The One Fund).  But see Weiss, supra note 156 (stating that to 
overcome contrary IRS policies, Mayor Menino engaged in “hacking the bureaucracy” by signing 
an executive order stating that the fund was performing an “essential government function”).  
 173. Lenny Bernstein, Boston Marathon Fund Releases Compensation Formula for 
Bombing Victims, WASH. POST (May 15, 2013) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/boston-marathon-fund-releases-
compensation-formula-for-bombing-victims/2013/05/15/187cb4c0-bcd7-11e2-9b09-
1638acc3942e_story.html?utm_term=.df84638a5955 [https://perma.cc/QA7J-9FQV].  
 174. Arsenault & Wallack, supra note 172. 
 175. Press Release, Attorney General Maura Healey, Resources Available to Victims of the 
Boston Marathon Attack (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-
releases/2013/2013-04-22-victim-resources.html [https://perma.cc/UHT3-MJU5].   
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uninsured medical and dental care, mental health counseling, funeral and burial 
costs, and loss of income.
176
  The objective of the state fund was to provide aid to 
those who were not sufficiently injured to qualify for The One Fund, but were 
still affected by the bombing, either emotionally or physically.
177
  In contrast to 
The One Fund and the 9/11 Fund, Massachusetts’s fund was not created for the 
victims of a specific disaster.  Rather, the Massachusetts fund was established in 
1967 to benefit victims of all violent crimes.
178
  Funded by financial penalties 
paid to the State as a result of criminal convictions and federal grants, the fund 
has provided victims and their families with up to $25,000.
179
 
As The One Fund and the Massachusetts state fund operate outside of the 
tort system, recipients need not relinquish their tort claims, unlike the 9/11 Fund 
or settlements in the class-action context, which typically seek global resolution 
of future claims.
180
  Under Boston and Massachusetts’s scheme, therefore, the 
tort system “remains the apex source of compensation for victims of personal 
injury.”
181
  As victims view the tort system as both an outlet to hold wrongdoers 
accountable as well as a means to compensation, research conducted by the Rand 
Institute reveals that VCFs do not wholly deter victims from bringing suit if they 
have not released their claims as recipients of VCF funds.
182
 
Accordingly, a compensation fund for victims of the Flint water crisis would 
be most effective if recipients were required to release individual and class 
claims, analogous to the 9/11 Fund.  If fund recipients were not barred from 
bringing tort suits, it would undercut the benefits of providing a fund altogether.  
Specifically, the City of Flint and the State of Michigan would be forced to 
expend their resources to defend lawsuits, and victims would confront the 
numerous barriers to recovery for injuries on a personal and class-wide basis, just 
as if a fund did not exist.  In fact, if a fund allowed for personal suits, those suits 
 
 176. Id. 




 178. Id. 
 179. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Announces $8.3 Million 
to Support Victims of Boston Marathon Bombings (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
attorney-general-announces-83-million-support-victims-boston-marathon-bombings 
[https://perma.cc/3YSH-JKFW] (stating that the Office for Victims of Crime awarded MOVA with 
the Antiterrorist and Emergency Assistance Program Grant to provide crisis and longer-term 
recovery to victims).  
 180. Heaton, Waggoner & Morikawa, supra note 150, at 1264. 
 181. Id. at 1266. 
 182. Id. at 1264; see also Lempert, supra note 130, at 31 (recognizing that a VCF is unlikely 
to satisfy victims’ emotional needs, unlike the tort system, because it does not uncover the 
root of the tragedy or hold the responsible party accountable for the consequences of its 
actions). 
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may even be less fruitful than if there were no fund in place, for victims’ potential 
recoveries may be limited by the amount they received from the fund even though 
public defendants would be forced to expend resources available to defend the 
lawsuits.
183
  In other words, municipal defendants sued in an official capacity 
would utilize claimants’ tax dollars for legal fees and yet claimants’ recovery 
would be reduced by the amount of public funds received.
184
 
Even if individual claims or class actions are foreclosed by a fund for Flint 
residents, there are additional hurdles to consider.  Unlike the Marathon 
bombings, the contamination of Flint’s water was not the result of criminal 
activity, but rather, a government misstep.  As a result, victims of the water crisis 
will not qualify for funds collected by the Michigan Victims Compensation 
Board—the parallel entity to MOVA.
185
  The Michigan Attorney General has 
charged Nick Lyon, the Director of Health and Human Services; Earley; the 
former Manager of the City of Flint Water Department; and the Drinking Water 
Chief and Water Supervisor of the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality with involuntary manslaughter of multiple Flint residents due to their 
negligent omission to inform the public of a foreseeable Legionnaires’ Disease 
outbreak from contaminated water.186  Lyon has been additionally charged with 
misconduct in office for intentionally misleading and withholding information 
about the Legionnaires’ Disease outbreak in Flint from the Governor.187  While 
prosecutors were skeptical that Flint officials would be charged for negligent 
omission from an environmental disaster, prosecutors have still not expressed 
 
 183. Heaton, Waggoner & Morikawa, supra note 150, at 1266. 
 184. As Flint is a municipal corporation, the problems Flint would face if residents could 
litigate class actions mirror the effects of securities fraud litigation on commercial 
businesses.  Just as legal fees from securities class actions are borne by investors, tort 
litigation against Flint would shift city funds generated by taxpayers to attorneys.  Tammy 
E. Hinshaw & Sally J.T. Necheles, 7 MICH. CIV. JUR. Municipal Corporation § 6, Westlaw 
(database updated February 2017); Andrew J. Pincus, What’s Wrong With Securities Class 
Action Lawsuits?, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 6 (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pd
f [https://perma.cc/LCH2-CG4P]; see also Paul Egan, No Grand Jury on Snyder Using 
Public Money for his Flint Legal Bills, DET. FREE PRESS (Oct. 25, 2016) (noting that the 
Ingham County Circuit Court denied the request for a grand jury investigation of Governor 
Snyder paying his criminal defense fees with taxpayer dollars). 
 185. See Crime Victims Compensation Act of 1976, Pub. Act 223, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
18.351-61 (1976). 
 186. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, INVESTIGATOR REPORT: FLINT WATER INVESTIGATION 
2 (June 14, 2017); Press Release, Attorney General Bill Schuette, Schuette Charges 
MDHHS Director Lyon, Four Others with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint Water Crisis 
(June 14, 2017), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849-423854--,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/GNB2-HRLB]. 
 187. INVESTIGATOR REPORT: FLINT WATER INVESTIGATION, supra note 186; Schuette 
Charges MDHHS Director Lyon, Four Others with Involuntary Manslaughter in Flint Water 
Crisis, supra note 186. 
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confidence in their ability to successfully convict these officials.
188
 
Not only is the source of the harm in Flint distinguishable from the attack in 
Boston, but the number of individuals harmed by the Flint water crisis greatly 
exceeds those affected by the bombings.  While a few hundred individuals have 
sought funds from The One Fund and the Massachusetts state fund, the entire 
population of Flint was arguably harmed by lead-contaminated water.  Therefore, 
not only must Michigan state funds derive from different sources than the 
Massachusetts fund, but there must also be greater funds available to effectively 
compensate all those in Flint who have been or will become injured by the 
contaminated water. 
To properly contour a cooperative state and private compensation scheme 
to account for the unique situation in Flint in light of these challenges, several 
strategies may be utilized.  In addition to barring recipients from pursuing tort 
litigation, the qualifications for the VCF should not flow from severity of injury.  
Whereas the protocol of The One Fund created four categories of recipients, 
reserving the greatest amount of compensation for families of those killed, double 
amputees, and those who suffered permanent brain damage from the 
bombings,
189
 protocol for administering funds to Flint residents must account for 
the latency of lead poisoning.  As the adverse health effects from lead exposure 
are not immediately apparent, in contrast to physical injuries from a violent 
attack, qualifications based upon proximity to contaminated water sources or the 
frequency and duration of consumption are better suited to the Flint water crisis 
than the severity of manifested injuries.  By administering funds in proportion to 
demonstrated need based upon categories derived from these modified 
qualifications for recipients, a dual state-based and private compensation scheme 
could serve as a source of relief for those who could not prove specific causation 
in a court of law. 
4. Lessons from the New Jersey Spill Fund: An Alternative to 
MOVA 
In light of the absence of a comparable state fund in Michigan to MOVA 
under the circumstances, a hybrid compensation scheme based upon The One 
Fund and the New Jersey Spill Fund, a state fund generated in response to 
environmental contamination, may reconcile the needs of those affected by the 
 
 188. Matthew Dolan, Michigan Health Director Lyon Targeted in Flint Water Criminal Probe, 
DET. FREE PRESS (Oct. 18, 2016, 10:15 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/10/18/nick-lyon-flint-
water-subpoena/92370664/ [https://perma.cc/2MJA-PZY3]; David M. Uhlmann, Opinion, Can the 
Flint Prosecutions Succeed?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/opinion/can-the-flint-prosecutions-succeed.html 
[https://perma.cc/EB63-CXZC].  
 189. Bernstein, supra note 172. 
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Marathon Bombings with the needs of those harmed by the Flint water crisis.  
With regard to drawing state funds to provide relief for environmental harm, 
Michigan may look to New Jersey for guidance.
190
  In 1976, the New Jersey 
Legislature adopted the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act) to 
provide compensation for property damage and personal injuries resulting from 
the discharge of petroleum and other hazardous substances from potable well 
treatment systems.
191
  By levying taxes on the initial transfer of petroleum and 
other hazardous substances from corporate facilities, the Fund has provided $86 
million to individuals, businesses, and governmental entities.
192
  Specifically, the 
Fund has been used to pay for clean-up and removal costs incurred by the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection for contaminated sites and for 
real property and personal injury damage claims relating to potable well treatment 
systems, public waterline installations, and remediation of contaminated sites.
193
  
Although corporate actors were not responsible for the contamination of Flint’s 
water, unlike the environmental contamination in New Jersey, a similar tax may 
be levied against the Flint water treatment plant and related officials on any 
income earned from switching and maintaining Flint’s unsafe water supply. 
The funds drawn from Michigan taxpayers would supplement those 
privately donated, analogous to the innovative approach of The One Fund, to 
provide expedient direct relief to those affected by the Flint water crisis.  As of 
October 2016, non-profit organizations in Flint have raised funds for the children 
of Flint in coordination with a committee of community members, Hurley 
Children’s Hospital, Mott Children’s Health Center, Greater Flint Health 
coalition, United Way of Genesee County, and the Community Foundation of 
Greater Flint.
194
  Additionally, the Safe Water Safe Homes Fund seeks to provide 
 
 190. Note that to the extent that Flint officials are charged with “violent” crimes for switching 
Flint’s water supply and tampering with evidence of contamination, Michigan may also draw state 
funds from the Michigan’s Crime Victim Compensation Fund.  See supra note 185 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the qualifications for a victim to be eligible for Michigan Crime 
Victim compensation based on the Crime Victims Compensation Act of 1976). 
 191. New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund (Spill Fund): Frequently Asked Questions, ENVTL. 
CLAIMS ADMIN., http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/finance/spillfund/spillfund_faqs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2CC-WBYL] (last updated Feb. 1, 2016) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58.10-23.11 
(West. Supp. 1987)). 
 192. Id.; see also Buonviaggio v. Hillsborough Twp. Comm., 583 A.2d. 739, 740-41 (N.J. 1991) 
(discussing the legislative history of the New Jersey Spill and Compensation Control Act, which 
taxes corporations upon their first transport of petroleum to provide for a Spill Fund for aggrieved 
property owners). 
 193. Buonviaggio, 583 A.2d at 740-41. 
 194. Jacqueline Gulledge, Flint Residents Still Need Help With Water Crisis, CNN (Oct. 30, 
2016, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/us/iyw-flint-michigan-water-crisis-how-to-
help/ [https://perma.cc/2U7J-HNSQ]; Flint Water Crisis Response – Community Foundation of 
Greater Flint, COMMUNITY FOUNDATION OF GREATER FLINT, 
https://www.cfgf.org/cfgf/GoodWork/FlintArea/WaterCrisis/tabid/855/Default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4WF7-B5UE] (last updated 2016). 
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 with funds to repair or replace damaged infrastructure, 
the Flint WaterWorks Fund aims to delivery clean water and safe food to Flint 
residents, and the Flint Child Health and Development Fund is raising donations 




Unlike The One Fund, which derived its success from being the only fund 
created for the purpose of compensating marathon victims and their families, the 
numerous Flint non-profits are competing for the same donations.
197
  Whereas 
the centralized The One Fund Boston raised $60 million in six days, all of which 
was distributed directly to victims and their families, less efficient compensation 
schemes with multiple divergent funds are unlikely to provide victims with 
speedy financial aid.
198
  If Michigan’s Governor Snyder and Flint’s Mayor 
Weaver are not able to follow the example of Governor Devall and Mayor 
Menino and create a single private fund administered by state actors at this point, 
these non-profits may provide sufficient direct compensation comparable to The 
One Fund.  To do so, however, these non-profits must seek to raise funds for all 
those harmed by lead-contaminated water, rather than solely children or other 
“high-risk” individuals.  Aside from providing tax credits to institutions and 
individuals who donate to the fund, the groups administering the fund could also 
collectively raise additional funds through crowdfunding,
199
 just as Boston 
families did to supplement aid generated by The One Fund and MOVA.
200
  
Further, if Michigan officials were willing to expend the resources necessary for 
a Flint fund to achieve 501(c)(3) status, it may lessen the need for additional funds 
to compensate recipients for taxes paid on awards.  Overall, if Michigan and Flint 
officials looked to New Jersey’s tactics to generate state funds, as well as 
Boston’s efforts to facilitate The One Fund, a dual state and private compensation 
 
 195. How Can I Help?, CITY OF FLINT, https://www.cityofflint.com/how-can-i-help/ 
[https://perma.cc/XYS3-9625] (last updated 2016) (“[H]igh-risk households” includes “those 
with children ages 0-6 years of age, children with elevated blood levels, pregnant women, 
senior citizens, residential day care facilities, people with compromised immune systems and 
households where water tests indicate a high level of lead at the tap”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Mike Schneider, OneOrlando Fund Changes Course, Will Give Money to Victims, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 17, 2016, 5:24 PM), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cb1a48969c1a445c825ec8fc0c5f895e/oneorlando-fund-
changes-course-will-give-money-victims [https://perma.cc/DR2Q-LCGE] (“The minute you 
have competing funds, all vying for donations, with all their uncoordinated criteria, their 
wildly divergent amounts that are distributed, it becomes competition.”).  
 198. Id. 
 199. See Kathleen Gray, Tax Credits for Charitable Donations May Be Restored, DET. FREE 
PRESS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/02/tax-credits-charitable-
donations-may-restored/79714466/ [https://perma.cc/Z7JS-QSFC] (noting that the State of 
Michigan Senate Finance committee unanimously voted to restore tax credits for donations to 
charitable organizations, which were eliminated as part of governor Snyder’s tax freeform policies). 
 200. Arsenault & Wallack, supra note 172.  
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scheme may serve as a substitute for a federal VCF for Flint residents. 
5. Business Implications 
Though a funding scheme with a centralized private fund would serve as an 
efficient source of direct compensation, it may pose risks to corporate donors.  
For example, outside of benefit corporations and non-profits, corporations may 
face dissatisfaction from investors or shareholders.  Shareholders may urge the 
corporation to increase shareholder wealth through dividends and share 
buybacks.
201
  Alternatively, corporations risk discontent from shareholders who 
want the business to reinvest surplus capital in the business.
202
  Moreover, 
investors critical of corporate contributions may argue that donations consume 
company resources to further the objectives of management, not shareholders.
203
 
However, even though there are attendant risks with a corporation donating 
to a private fund, there are many benefits.  Specifically, corporations may claim 
a tax deduction for charitable contributions.
204
  Further, contributing to a well-
publicized tragedy may increase the company’s positive brand recognition, even 
if increased perception is difficult to quantify in terms of added value for 
shareholders.
205
  And for companies that conduct business in Michigan, or Flint 
specifically, donations may help foster relationships with community leaders, 
reducing any special interest group obstacles the corporation may face.
206
  
Additionally, because of the centralized nature of the proposed Flint fund, 
corporations interested in donating need not expend resources on research and 
development or due diligence to find an appropriate charity.  Thus, not only 
would donating to the centralized fund benefit corporate donors, but the single-
fund structure may also attract more contributions than several individual funds 
 
 201. See Justin Fox, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Do . . . What Exactly?, 
HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2012 (citing Fulton Friedman, A Friednzan Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 1970), http://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-
social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5W6X-3NP5]) (“There is 
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits . . . .”); see also Alfred Rappaport, Ten Ways to Create 
Shareholder Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2006 (noting that value-conscious companies with 
excess capital and limited value-creating investment opportunities should return money to 
shareholders in the form of dividends or share buybacks to allow them to earn higher returns 
from other investments and prevent the company from making poor investments). 
 202. Fox, supra note 201. 
 203. Matteo Tonello, Making the Business Case for Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. L. 
SCH. FORUM (Aug. 20, 2011). 
 204. I.R.S. Pub. 542 (Dec. 2016). 
 205. Tonello, supra note 203 (finding that corporate giving programs can provide 
businesses with a competitive advantage by increasing name recognition and reputation 
among consumers). 
 206. Tonello, supra note 203. 
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that would require administrative expenditures on the part of corporate donors. 
CONCLUSION 
The dire consequences of Governor Snyder’s approach to urban policy in 
Flint illustrate the shortfalls of viewing systemic financial problems in a vacuum.  
In Flint, the pattern of financial delinquency resulted from changes in the 
commercial landscape, housing policy, suburban flight, and endemic racial and 
socioeconomic injustice in the region.  At the same time, the overarching 
deficiencies in the state’s infrastructure and economic strategy contributed to the 
toxicity of the public water supply in Flint. 
The same tension between local economic needs and federal spending 
inheres in the available methods for compensating Flint residents.  Although the 
contamination of Flint’s water supply had a city-wide impact, Flint claimants’ 
inability to prove specific causation for individual injuries will likely continue to 
impede their ability to recover in a federal court of law on an individualized basis.  
At the same time, the predominance of individualized determinations will, 
ironically, weigh against claimants’ ability to seek compensatory and punitive 
damages on a class-wide basis. 
Accordingly, Flint claimants would benefit from a VCF that operates 
outside of the tort system.  Although academics have opined that a federal VCF 
is the most promising source of recovery for Flint residents, a federal VCF is 
unlikely to come to fruition.  As the Flint water crisis is a localized emergency 
that does not pose a threat to a revenue-generating industry, similar to Hurricane 
Katrina, Congress lacks the financial incentives that motivated the enactment of 
the 9/11 Fund.  This is particularly true in light of the current uncertain political 
climate with the change of administration. 
As such, Governor Snyder and Mayor Weaver should seek to unify non-
profits in the Flint community to quell competition between local charities 
seeking donations from private actors across the country, analogous to The One 
Fund.  At the same time, Michigan and Flint would benefit from working together 
to administer a state fund comparable to the New Jersey Spill Fund that responds 
to local needs, such as the cost of repairing damage to real property in Flint from 
corroded pipes.  Following the example of Boston, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey, collaboration between government officials, private corporations and 
individuals, and community organizations may provide aggrieved Flint residents 
with compensation.  If Michigan state and Flint officials choose to forgo 
Governor Snyder’s hyper-localized, numbers-driven approach to municipal 
economic policy, they may facilitate a large-scale compensation scheme that 
operates in both the public and private sectors.  By recognizing the overarching 
harm to the city, while providing funds in accordance with individual need, 
parallel private-state compensation funds would inject needed resources back 
WEISS_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2017  2:55 PM 
2017] THE FLINT, MICHIGAN WATER CRISIS 1059 
 
into the Flint community—a strong step in the direction of restoring the Vehicle 
City to its former glory. 
 
